Saturday, 31 December 2011

A difficult road ahead for Yemen's political transition o

Source: Foreign Policy,31/12:2011
Posted By David W. Alley, Abdulghani  Al Iryani.

On Nov. 23, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh belatedly fulfilled his pledge to sign the GCC initiative. His signing potentially opened space for a peaceful transfer of power and far-reaching reforms. Yet, such a positive outcome is far from guaranteed and will largely depend on how domestic and international actors tackle three interrelated challenges: 1) preventing political infighting and spoilers from derailing the accord's implementation; 2) demonstrating tangible progress by providing security and basic services to Yemeni citizens; and 3) addressing two key weaknesses of the initiative, political inclusiveness and transitional justice.

First proposed in April 2011, the GCC initiative outlined a "30-60 Transition Plan" whereby the president would transfer power to his vice president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, after one month in exchange for immunity from prosecution. An opposition-led coalition government would then hold presidential elections two months after the president's resignation.

The agreement and accompanying implementation mechanisms signed on Nov. 23 retain this basic framework and timeline with important exceptions. The most notable among these is that Saleh will retain his position along with limited authorities until elections are held on Feb. 21, 2011. It also established a steering committee to oversee the restoration of security and the reintegration of military/security forces. Moreover, it greatly expanded on the original agreement by providing much needed clarification on questions of responsibility, sequencing, and oversight.

As currently defined, the transitional period is divided into two phases. The first lasts approximately three months, from the signing of the initiative until early elections on Feb. 21, 2011. During this time, the president delegates significant authority to Hadi, an opposition-led coalition government is established, and preparations are made for early presidential elections in which the vice president is the consensus candidate. Phase two begins after elections and consists of a two-year period devoted to national dialogue and constitutional reform.

All things considered, implementation is going relatively smoothly and political leaders are meeting key agreement benchmarks. Shortly following signature, the vice president issued a presidential decree calling for early elections. Then, on Dec. 10 , a national unity government was officially sworn in. The new government is headed by an opposition prime minister and ministerial portfolios are divided equally between the opposition and the president's party, the General People's Congress (GPC). In late November and early December, intense fighting in the flashpoint city of Taiz threatened to undermine the agreement, but by Dec. 4 local mediators secured a ceasefire. That same day, Hadi formed the Military Affairs Committee tasked with overseeing military/security de-escalation and restructuring. The committee began clearing streets of checkpoints in Sanaa and other cities on Dec. 17 and they plan to complete the task within one week. In short, the technicalities of the agreement are being implemented, yet many challenges remain, not least of which is a political environment with a lack of trust, desperate economic and humanitarian conditions, and significant inclusion and justice deficits in the agreement itself.

Political infighting and potential spoilers

The most critical challenge during phase one arguably will be keeping signatories moving in the same direction and holding potential spoilers at bay. This will be especially difficult in the military/security sector where progress has been comparatively slow and where the principle of "no victor, no vanquished" has left intact the two armed power-centers: the army and security forces controlled by Saleh's family on the one hand and a combination of defected army units controlled by General Ali Mohsen, tribesmen loyal to the al-Ahmar clan, and Islah-controlled militias, on the other.

Because both sides have maintained their positions, and each is deeply suspicious of the other, it would be imprudent to begin with fundamental military or security restructuring. Instead, the first priority should be on coordinated de-escalation. This appears to be happening, as the Military Affairs Committee has called for the removal of all checkpoints and roadblocks, the return of military units to their barracks and, a return of militias to their villages, all of which is to be completed by Dec. 24. If carried out, these measures will go far in restoring a sense of normalcy and security to the capital and other affected cities.

Assuming successful implementation, these steps could then set the stage for the kind of in-depth institutional restructuring that is necessary to establish civilian control over the military. This would entail standardized hiring, firing, and retirement practices as well as the regular rotation of military and security officers. By addressing such matters only after elections are held, the authorities can satisfy the widespread public desire to remove -- or at least clearly restrict the influence of -- certain military officers, while at the same time avoiding a precipitous approach that carries the potential of provoking a stalemate or, worse, armed confrontation, during the first phase.

So far, international scrutiny has focused almost exclusively on Saleh. That might have been understandable in the past, but it no longer can suffice. At one point or another, each of the armed groups mentioned above has been responsible for violence and contributed to an environment where human rights violations have occurred; going forward, either side could torpedo meaningful implementation of the agreement. Henceforth, the international community will need to closely monitor all parties and hold them accountable -- including publicly reprimanding and sanctioning those proven uncooperative.

In addition to military and security obstacles, the agreement could be undermined by political infighting both within the coalition government and among political parties. Already, the opposition has charged the GPC with a number of violations, including destroying documents in sensitive ministries like interior, finance, and justice. For its part, the GPC accuses the opposition of planning to violate the spirit of the initiative by, among other things, using its ministerial portfolios to proceed with investigations and prosecution of regime insiders. GPC supporters also complain that the opposition has yet to fulfill its commitment under the agreement to halt any direct support for the protests. To date, media outlets on both sides have made deeply inflammatory statements, stoking tensions and undermining the potential for cooperation.

Encouraging opposing parties to honor their commitments under the initiative and to work together will be a constant challenge. While international actors must play an important monitoring role in this respect, so too should domestic oversight agencies and civil society groups. Domestic tools exist, including the civil service law which governs hiring and firing within ministries. Enforcement of this law could minimize the risk of politicization of bureaucratic decisions and more clearly circumscribe political conflict. International monitors also could work closely with the Central Organization for Control and Audit in overseeing corruption. The abuse of public finance was a central grievance against the Saleh regime and many Yemenis are now concerned that the opposition will be tempted to commit similar abuses. As with the military/security sector, control over the public finances sector must be shared, transparent, and closely monitored to ensure balance and to reduce tensions during the transition. Independent youth activists, their strong misgivings about the GCC initiative notwithstanding, can play a role by pressuring the government as well as political parties to operate lawfully, transparently, and in keeping with their pledges of reform.

Delivering Security and Basic Services

A successful political transition will also depend on the government's capacity to produce tangible progress in the lives of ordinary citizens, notably in the realms of security and basic services. As noted, some improvement has been made on the security front through the Military Affairs Committee. Among other needs, the priorities should be returning electricity and water provision to pre-crisis levels as well as stabilizing the price of, and improving access to, diesel and petrol. Meeting these objectives will not be possible without substantial international financial assistance, which ought to be closely monitored by donors. Insofar as possible, donors should discourage reactivation of petrol and diesel subsidies, a step with potentially dire fiscal consequences.

Political Inclusiveness and Transitional Justice

The accord is not without critics, or flaws. At its core, it reflects a power-sharing arrangement between the president and his party, the GPC, on one hand and a coalition of political opposition parties, known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), on the other. Largely missing from the arrangement are several important stakeholders, including but not limited to: the Houthi rebels in the north; the southern movement; and an emerging constituency that was particularly active during the uprising, the independent youth. As they and others see it, the initiative is little more than a reshuffling of the deck, a new allocation of authority among elites that -- in one form or another -- have been implicated in the organization of power around Saleh. The principal beneficiaries, they point out, are the GPC and the most influential member of the JMP opposition, the Islamist Islah party, which also enjoys historical ties to the regime. Many also reject the immunity clause, arguing that those responsible for abuses should be investigated and brought to trial.

Establishment of a more inclusive process cannot wait until the onset of the national dialogue. Although reducing tensions among members of the political elite is both legitimate and necessary, a parallel track should be put in place to bring in the three aforementioned groups, lest their exclusion obstruct the government's ability to carry out early elections and a credible dialogue.

Fortunately, the implementation mechanism document mandates that the new government form a liaison committee to communicate with youth groups and it makes clear that the national dialogue in phase two must include all political actors and forces. Yet, thus far, inclusion efforts have taken a back seat to forging elite alliances at the political center between existing political parties. In many ways, the Houthi rebellion in the north, the southern movement, and the youth initiative uprising were a product of the failure of existing political parties and institutions to adequately aggregate and represent popular grievances and demands. As such, it is imperative that immediate action be taken to broaden meaningful inclusion.

Several steps could be taken in this respect. The government should open up direct lines of communication with these three constituencies in order to better understand their views on, as well as objections to, the structure and agenda of the national dialogue. It could also review the findings of existing government and or party-funded studies that have assessed the situation in the south and in Sadaa and consider implementing applicable recommendations. Important confidence-building measures for the south in particular may include: releasing remaining political prisoners (in a welcome step, the government released Hassan Ba-Aum, a prominent southern movement Hiraak leader who calls for southern independence, shortly after it was formed), investigating human rights abuses, removing certain controversial military and security officers, and more assertively facilitating humanitarian access to areas such as Abyan and Aden. Both the GPC and the opposition have been careful to ensure that southerners are well represented in the unity government. This is an important indication of good-will, but it is in no way a substitute for engaging with the southern movement and others regarding their priorities and preferences for the national dialogue.

The GCC initiative also suffers from the insufficient attention it pays to issues of transitional justice and reconciliation. Yemenis are sharply divided over the question of whether Saleh and his supporters ought to enjoy immunity. Many in the opposition insist that regime insiders must be investigated and prosecuted for crimes committed during the uprising; others believe that such an approach would distract the coalition government from its priorities, namely building a new state; still others (essentially Saleh backers), argue that the real criminals are on the opposition side and that individuals such as Ali Mohsen and Hameed al-Ahmar should be brought to trial.

Who should benefit from immunity and how to render justice are divisive, sensitive, and currently unsettled issues. Ignoring them, or putting them aside, risks undermining chances of a lasting political settlement. Still, signatories of the GCC initiative committed themselves to pass immunity legislation for the president and those who have worked with him. Qualms notwithstanding, the signatories should honor their pledge. However, this agreement does not in any way preclude thorough investigation of human rights violations and a serious national discussion regarding matters related to transitional justice. This discussion is essential to prevent cycles of revenge and to address the deeply-felt desire to expose unlawful behavior and compensate victims. In this respect, the country could build on a long national tradition that centers primarily on exposing the truth and compensating victims as opposed to punishing perpetrators. Ultimately, Yemenis will have to determine how to address their past, but it is best that this discussion begin now.

David W. Alley is a Lieutenant-Colonel in the U.S. Army (Retired), a retired Middle East Foreign Area Officer, and is currently the COO of Lime -- Abu Dhabi, a political risk advisory firm. Abdulghani al-Iryani is an independent political analyst based in Sanaa, Yemen. 

Thursday, 29 December 2011

2011, Year of Change in Yemen

By Nasser Arrabyee,29/12/2011

Yemen witnessed unprecedented and great events during 2011 like some other Arab countries which were swept by  the so-called Arab Spring.

The events changed almost every thing traditional in terms of thinking of the social and political life of people.

Dreams and aspirations and ambitions of almost every one were more than ever before over the recent history of Yemen.

Generally speaking, almost everyone wanted a new Yemen, new State, and new life with freedom,justice and dignity.

Though very little of these general things have been achieved,but the way of realizing dreams and reaching ambitions has become  at least clearer and smoother than ever before in history also.

The determination and desire of people  to keep going in the same way until all goals and objectives are achieved is still standing after one  year of arguments and conflicts at all  levels of life.

On November 23rd, 2011, almost all conflicting parties agreed to end the  long standing political crisis and they immediately started a long and difficult but allegedly  correct  road to build the  new Yemen where all dreams and ambitions of better life can come true. 

On February 21st, 2012, the Yemenis will elect a new President instead of the outgoing President Ali Abdullah Saleh. 

The new President will run the country only two years during which a comprehensive national dialogue will be conducted for paving the way for the modern State. A new constitution will be formulated, and referendum on ir will be held. 

Then, new presidential elections will be held during 2014, and the elected president will set a date for parliamentary elections.
 
It's been more than one month now since they started  implementing  a step-by-step two year long  road map for reaching the promised  modern and  civil State that almost every Yemeni   is talking about, though with different views. 

The road map, locally called the scheduled  implementation plan, was based on an internationally supported deal initiated by the Saudi-led six gulf nations and the UN resolution 2014 on  solving the Yemeni crisis.

But different people  look differently to what happened during 2011, and what  was achieved so far and what might happen and might  be achieved during 2012 and after that. 

The Weekly interviewed on Monday December 26, 2011, many Yemenis in the Yemeni  capital Sanaa on what happened so far and what might happen more from the protests of one year.

Adel A Arrabeai, leading protester and political activist, said that the year 2011 divided the recent history to 'before' and 'after'  this date. 

" 2011 was   the year of the birth of our historic change movement," said Mr Arrabeai.

" It was the year during which we faced major challenges and we achieved major achievements including overthrowing the regime," he added.

The 2012 will be  the year of planting and sowing the seeds of the  modern and civil State, the long standing  dream of Yemenis, Arrabeai expected.

The activist Naif Al Buraiki, disagrees,however, with Mr. Arrabeai, saying the political solution will not work and the conflicts will continue.

"The GCC initiative will fail and more conflicts and more violence and blood shed will happen," said Mr Al Buraiki.



The political analyst, Abdul Khalik Alwan , on his part, said two things might happen during the 2012 in the Arab world in general.

If the Arab Spring was made by the Arab themselves not dictated to them, Mr. Alwan expected a stage of genuine democracy and human rights after removing the rest of the Arab rulers during 2012.

"But if the Arab Spring was not made by  the Arab will, and Arab were only actors, then the year 2012 will be the end of hope that Arab can do something," Mr Alwan said.

Mr Baleek Mohammed, political activist,said what happened in Yemen during 2011, was unprecedented uprising against poverty and financial, administrative and political corruption.

Mr Mohammed expected that Islamists in Yemen would dominate because they have  more organized members than the other  parties.

However, the vice  spokesmen of the Yemen ruling party, semi-secular party, Mr Abdul Hafeez Al Nehari excluded any domination of  the Islamists in Yemen saying they  are not like their counterparts in the other Arab countries like Tunisia and Egypt.

" I do not think the Islamists here in Yemen will dominate because  they already  tried but  failed," said Al Nehari.

The main groups of Islamists in Yemen,  especially the brotherhood, have always been participating in all political and democratic processes and never been directly banned like Tunisia or partially banned like Egypt.

"The people tried the Islamists in  two coalition governments in the past," said Al 
Nehari.

"During this crisis, the Islamists were not democratic enough  with other forces like liberals and leftists,"

" So Islamist lost a lot."

 Almost every day, Islamists from Islah party, which leads the opposition coalition,  fight with others  over who would speak in the stage and who  would say what  in the public squares of protests especially in Sanaa. 

They also fight with others on women activities and their clothes.

On Sunday,  December 25th, 2011,  for instance, about 15 people were injured in big fight with  hands and  sticks and knives in the stage of the Change Square in Sanaa.      

Wednesday, 28 December 2011

2011, Year of Change in Yemen

By Nasser Arrabyee,29/12/2011

Yemen witnessed unprecedented and great events during 2011 like some other Arab countries which were swept by  the so-called Arab Spring.

The events changed almost every thing traditional in terms of thinking of the social and political life of people.

Dreams and aspirations and ambitions of almost every one were more than ever before over the recent history of Yemen.

Generally speaking, almost everyone wanted a new Yemen, new State, and new life with freedom,justice and dignity.

Though very little of these general things have been achieved,but the way of realizing dreams and reaching ambitions has become  at least clearer and smoother than ever before in history also.

The determination and desire of people  to keep going in the same way until all goals and objectives are achieved is still standing after one  year of arguments and conflicts at all  levels of life.

On November 23rd, 2011, almost all conflicting parties agreed to end the  long standing political crisis and they immediately started a long and difficult but allegedly  correct  road to build the  new Yemen where all dreams and ambitions of better life can come true.
 
It's been more than one month now since they started  implementing  a step-by-step two year long  road map for reaching the promised  modern and  civil State that almost every Yemeni   is talking about, though with different views. 

The road map, locally called the scheduled  implementation plan, was based on an internationally supported deal initiated by the Saudi-led six gulf nations and the UN resolution 2014 on  solving the Yemeni crisis.

But different people  look differently to what happened during 2011, and what  was achieved so far and what might happen and might  be achieved during 2012 and after that. 

The Weekly interviewed on Monday December 26, 2011, many Yemenis in the Yemeni  capital Sanaa on what happened so far and what might happen more from the protests of one year.

Adel A Arrabeai, leading protester and political activist, said that the year 2011 divided the recent history to 'before' and 'after'  this date. 

" 2011 was   the year of the birth of our historic change movement," said Mr Arrabeai.

" It was the year during which we faced major challenges and we achieved major achievements including overthrowing the regime," he added.

The 2012 will be  the year of planting and sowing the seeds of the  modern and civil State, the long standing  dream of Yemenis, Arrabeai expected.

The activist Naif Al Buraiki, disagrees,however, with Mr. Arrabeai, saying the political solution will not work and the conflicts will continue.

"The GCC initiative will fail and more conflicts and more violence and blood shed will happen," said Mr Al Buraiki.



The political analyst, Abdul Khalik Alwan , on his part, said two things might happen during the 2012 in the Arab world in general.

If the Arab Spring was made by the Arab themselves not dictated to them, Mr. Alwan expected a stage of genuine democracy and human rights after removing the rest of the Arab rulers during 2012.

"But if the Arab Spring was not made by  the Arab will, and Arab were only actors, then the year 2012 will be the end of hope that Arab can do something," Mr Alwan said.

Mr Baleek Mohammed, political activist,said what happened in Yemen during 2011, was unprecedented uprising against poverty and financial, administrative and political corruption.

Mr Mohammed expected that Islamists in Yemen would dominate because they have  more organized members than the other  parties.

However, the vice  spokesmen of the Yemen ruling party, semi-secular party, Mr Abdul Hafeez Al Nehari excluded any domination of  the Islamists in Yemen saying they  are not like their counterparts in the other Arab countries like Tunisia and Egypt.

" I do not think the Islamists here in Yemen will dominate because  they already  tried but  failed," said Al Nehari.

The main groups of Islamists in Yemen,  especially the brotherhood, have always been participating in all political and democratic processes and never been directly banned like Tunisia or partially banned like Egypt.

"The people tried the Islamists in  two coalition governments in the past," said Al 
Nehari.

"During this crisis, the Islamists were not democratic enough  with other forces like liberals and leftists,"

" So Islamist lost a lot."

 Almost every day, Islamists from Islah party, which leads the opposition coalition,  fight with others  over who would speak in the stage and who  would say what  in the public squares of protests especially in Sanaa. 

They also fight with others on women activities and their clothes.

On Sunday,  December 25th, 2011,  for instance, about 15 people were injured in big fight with  hands and  sticks and knives in the stage of the Change Square in Sanaa.      

Yemen Government Workers Rally Against Corruption

Source:AP,28/12/2011

By AHMED AL-HAJ Associated Press

Labor strikes spread through Yemen Wednesday as workers demanded reforms and dismissal of managers over alleged corruption linked to the country's outgoing president.

Corruption was one of the grievances that ignited mass protests against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in February. After months of stalling, Saleh last month signed an agreement to transfer power.

The deal includes immunity for prosecution for the longtime leader, but protesters reject that. They are also demanding that his relatives and associates, also suspected of corruption, be removed from their posts in the government and military and put on trial.

Months of political turmoil in Yemen, pitting tribes and army units against each other during mass demonstrations as Saleh fought to stay in power, have given the dangerous al-Qaida branch in Yemen more freedom of action. The Islamist militants have taken over territory in Yemen's south, including several towns.

The strikes are following a pattern. Workers lock the gates to an institution, and then they storm the offices of their supervisors, demanding their replacement with bosses who are not tainted with corruption allegations. So far the scenario has played out in 18 state agencies.

"This is the real revolution, the institutions revolution," said Mohammed Gabaal, an 40-year-old accountant who is on strike. "The president has appointed a ring of corrupt people all over government agencies."

The case of the Military Economic Institution stands out. Hundreds of workers demonstrated in front of the building on Wednesday.

The key agency hauls in significant revenues from naval transport and other investments, but its budget is kept secret. Striking workers are demanding dismissal of the agency manager, Hafez Mayad, who is from Saleh's tribe and is seen as one of the regime's most powerful and corrupt figures.

Opponents of the Saleh regime charge that armed civilians who attacked protesters in the capital of Sanaa got their funds from Mayad.

Other strikes are under way at the state TV, Sanaa police headquarters and another institution affiliated with the military.

The wave of strikes began last week when employees of the national airline, Yemenia Airways, walked off their jobs demanding dismissal of the director, Saleh's son-in-law, charging him with plundering the company's assets and driving it into bankruptcy. The government gave in to the demands.

Tuesday, 27 December 2011

Path is cleared for President Saleh to visit US

27/12/2011
By Mark Landler and Eric Schmitt
 
HONOLULU,US — The Obama administration has decided in principle to allow the embattled president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to enter the United States for medical treatment, subject to certain assurances, two administration officials said
But those conditions — including a proposed itinerary — have not yet been submitted to the American Embassy in Yemen, these officials said, and no visa has yet been issued to Mr. Saleh.

The decision of whether to admit Yemen’s longtime leader has stirred a vigorous debate within the administration, with some officials fearing sharp criticism for appearing to provide a safe haven for a reviled Arab figure accused of responsibility for the death of hundreds of antigovernment protesters.

The complex negotiations over Mr. Saleh’s visa request attest to the high stakes for the administration, which urgently wants to secure room for political progress in Yemen but does not want to allow Mr. Saleh to use a medical visit as a way to shore up his political position. Nor do they want to play into Mr. Saleh’s penchant for keeping people off kilter.

If allowed to enter, Mr. Saleh would be the first Arab leader to request, and to be granted, an extended stay in the United States since political unrest began convulsing the region a year ago.

One administration official said that there was no further “impediment” to issuing Mr. Saleh a visa, and that he could arrive at NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital as soon as the end of this week for additional treatment of medical problems stemming from a near-fatal bomb blast in June at the mosque in his presidential complex.

Though the administration had been concerned that approval would anger the many Yemenis eager to see Mr. Saleh prosecuted for the killing of protesters by his security forces, some believe that giving him a way out of Yemen, even temporarily, could help smooth the way to elections next year and perhaps end a political crisis that has brought the government of the impoverished nation to the brink of collapse.

“In the end, we felt there was enough good to be gained that it was worth managing the criticism that we’d get, including any comparisons to past episodes,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the arrangement was still being completed.

The official was referring to President Jimmy Carter’s decision in 1979 to admit the ailing shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, into the United States for medical treatment. That so infuriated the Islamic revolutionaries who had overthrown the shah that they stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage.

Antigovernment activists in Yemen said in recent days that they were worried that the United States would grant Mr. Saleh refuge and that if it did, they would demand he be returned for prosecution at home.

In a statement on Sunday in Hawaii, where President Obama is vacationing this week, the administration said that if Mr. Saleh was granted a visa, it would be only for “legitimate medical treatment.”

On Monday, the White House denied that it had made a decision on whether to grant Mr. Saleh a visa. “U.S. officials are continuing to consider President Saleh’s request to enter the country for the sole purpose of seeking medical treatment,” said the White House’s deputy press secretary, Joshua R. Earnest, “but initial reports that permission has already been granted are not true.”

Still, it appeared that the administration was also looking for a way to help calm the political chaos that has undermined efforts to prevent terrorist groups from operating in Yemen.

“The main goal is to remove him physically from Yemen so there’s no way he can meddle in the political process there,” the official said. “Getting him medical treatment seemed a logical way to do this.”

Mr. Saleh would not be allowed to bring a large entourage or use his visit for political reasons, the official said.

Mr. Saleh contacted the American Embassy in Yemen’s capital, Sana, about the visa, officials said. His lingering injuries from the bomb blast include shrapnel wounds and extensive burns. The most serious medical condition is a balance problem caused by inner-ear damage.

A spokeswoman for NewYork-Presbyterian, Myrna Manners, said she could not confirm whether Mr. Saleh would be going there. “As of now, we are not admitting him to NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital,” she said.

After Mr. Saleh’s three decades in power, doubts remain about his motives for departing now. He signed an accord a month ago in Saudi Arabia, agreeing to step down and authorizing an election in February to choose a new president. But until then, he maintains his title and much of his authority. Fears that he might find a way to hang on to power have hampered Yemen’s transition and played a role in the chronic political violence gripping the country, the poorest in the Middle East.

On Saturday, government security forces opened fire on protesters in Sana, killing at least nine people. The demonstrators were protesting a deal that would grant Mr. Saleh legal immunity if he gave up his post.

The United States has found itself in a sometimes awkward position as the unrest in the Arab world has swept through Yemen. The administration conducts extensive counterterrorism operations with the Saleh government on suspected Qaeda cells. It was unclear whether the United States was Mr. Saleh’s first choice for a destination, and as officials weighed his request, some worried that he might stop in other countries and seek support for some kind of effort to stay in power.

“They don’t want him to get back into the game,” said another official, “and everything he’s done since he went to Riyadh suggests he hasn’t entirely given up.”

Part of the problem is divining what the president is thinking. Some American officials seem persuaded by Mr. Saleh’s frequent claims that he has no desire to return to power. Others are less certain.

The two key officials involved in the decision are John O. Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser, and the American ambassador in Yemen, Gerald M. Feierstein. Mr. Brennan almost certainly took the decision to Mr. Obama for final approval, an official said.

On Sunday, Mr. Brennan called Yemen’s vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, to urge the government to show restraint against protesters, Mr. Earnest said.

“Mr. Brennan emphasized strongly the need for Yemeni security forces to show maximum restraint when dealing with demonstrations, and called upon all sides to refrain from provocative acts that could spur further violence,” Mr. Earnest said.

Vice President Hadi, who is supposed to assume Mr. Saleh’s powers during the transition, told Mr. Brennan that the government would investigate the deaths and injuries, Mr. Earnest said. Shortly after the June bombing, Mr. Saleh was flown to a hospital in Saudi Arabia. But after three months, he returned to Yemen.

On Saturday, Mr. Saleh told reporters that he was leaving “not for treatment, but to get out of sight and the media, to calm the atmosphere for the unity government to hold the presidential election,” according to The Associated Press. Yet that statement seemed calculated for domestic consumption, a Yemeni official said, and Mr. Saleh added that he hoped to return to work as an “opposition figure.”


Mark Landler reported from Honolulu, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Robert F. Worth contributed reporting from Washington, and Anemona Hartocollis from New York.

Monday, 26 December 2011

Yemeni intelligence officer gunned down in Aden

Source: Xinhua, 26/12/2011
              
ADEN, Yemen-- A high-ranking officer of the Yemeni military intelligence agency was gunned down Sunday evening by unidentified assailants in the southern port city of Aden, a security official told Xinhua.

The local security official said on condition of anonymity that three unknown attackers opened fire with barrage of bullets on the vehicle of colonel Hussein al-Bishi, killing him in a main street in Sheikh Othman district in Aden city.

The intelligence officer was hit in the head by a bullet and died at the scene, the official said, adding that the attackers managed to escape after the shooting.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack. But the incident bore the hallmarks of the al-Qaida group, according to the official.

A police officer said that after the attack, local government authorities has tightened up the security measures across the port city to deter any armed terrorists to infiltrate into Aden from the neighboring province of Abyan.

Taking advantage of Yemen's unrest to bolster their presence in the country's southern and eastern regions, militants of the al- Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula have been launching sporadic shoot- outs and motorbike attacks on security and intelligence officials during the past few months.

Saturday, 24 December 2011

President Saleh said would travel soon to US

By Nasser Arrabyee, 24/12/2011

The Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh also said he would travel to United States soon but  not only for treatment but also for political affairs.

And he said  he would return to Yemen to join the opposition through his party after a new president is elected on February 21, 2012.

Saleh  accused the Islamist tribal leader Hamid Al Ahmar of being behind the terrorist attack on him  and his top aides on June 3, 2011.

Saleh also said in a press conference held in his Palace late Saturday, that Hamid Al Ahmar funded the march from Taiz to Sanaa.

Saleh said that the  defected general Ali Muhsen has no more than 300 soldiers who  still loyal to him now.